Governing the Commons: Beyond the Tragedy
1. Is the Tragedy of the Commons Inevitable?
Garrett Hardin's View:
Garrett Hardin, in his influential 1968 paper, argued that the tragedy is inevitable because individuals, acting in their own self-interest, will inevitably deplete a shared resource. He proposed two main solutions to this dilemma: state regulation (socialism) or privatization.
Critique of Hardin’s View:
Hardin's pessimistic view has been widely criticized. Both his proposed solutions have often failed in practice, with state control leading to neglect and privatization excluding local communities who depend on the resource. The core critique is that Hardin's model was a hypothetical "free-for-all" and did not account for how real-world communities manage shared resources.
2. Key Criticisms of Hardin’s "Tragedy of the Commons"
| Criticism | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Lack of Real-World Evidence | Hardin's model was hypothetical. It ignored numerous examples of successfully managed commons throughout history. |
| Misunderstanding of Commons | Hardin confused open-access resources (no rules) with common-pool resources (often governed by local rules and norms). Real commons are rarely “free-for-all.” |
| Neglect of Local Institutions | Hardin overlooked the ability of communities to self-organize and create effective governance systems (e.g., through councils, customs, sanctions). |
| Bias Towards Top-Down Control | Hardin’s solutions (state regulation/privatization) often displaced local communities and ignored their traditional knowledge and governance systems. |
3. Common Property Resources (CPRs) – N.S. Jodha’s Work
Definition: Common Property Resources (CPRs) are resources available to the entire community of a village, where no individual has exclusive property rights.
Examples: Village pastures, common forests, wastelands, threshing grounds, watersheds, drainage systems, ponds, tanks, rivers, riverbeds, and groundwater.
Significance: N.S. Jodha’s study (1980s) showed that 74% of fuelwood for the poor in North Karnataka came from CPRs, highlighting their critical role in supporting rural livelihoods.
4. The Role of Local Institutions and Collective Action
Elinor Ostrom’s Research: Elinor Ostrom, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for her work, demonstrated that communities can effectively manage commons through self-organization, collective rule-making, and local monitoring and enforcement.
Key Insight: Community-driven governance often outperforms top-down state control or privatization.
5. International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC)
Origin: Started as the Common Property Network (1984) → became IASCP (1989) → renamed IASC (2006) to reflect a broader focus.
Growth: Membership grew from 200 to over 1,000, especially after Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in Economics.
Mission: A global network of researchers, practitioners, and policymakers focused on improving the management of shared resources (forests, fisheries, water, digital spaces).
Activities: Organizes biennial global conferences (e.g., Utrecht 2017, Hyderabad 2011).
6. Lessons from Successful Commons Governance
- Commons are neither purely public nor private; they require context-specific governance.
- Local institutions and collective action are often more effective than centralized control.
- Successful cases worldwide show diverse strategies for managing commons sustainably.
Exam Tip 📝
Understand the limitations of Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons theory, especially his neglect of local institutions and community governance. Focus on the contributions of Elinor Ostrom and N.S. Jodha, emphasizing that commons can be managed successfully through collective action and local rules. Be familiar with examples of Common Property Resources (CPRs) and their socio-economic significance. Remember that effective commons governance often involves a balance between local participation and broader institutional support.
No Comments